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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE J. ALLEN, for himself and all other
residents and taxpayers of Tooele County,
Utah, similarly situated,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

TOOELE COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Utah; GEORGE WILLIS SMITH,
GEORGE BUZIANIS and R. STERLING
HALLADAY, individually and as members of
the Board of Commissioners of Tooele County;
ENERGY LEASING SERVICES, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and THE ·MAGNESIUM PROJECT, a joint venture,

Case No.
11297

Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Defendants and Respondents
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a class action for a declaratory judgment determining questions of constitutionality and interpretation of a state statute and actions taken and to be taken
by the defendants and respondents pursuant to authority
contained in the statute.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, without a jury, was presented docuinrintary and testimonial evidence and entered judgment
1

in favor of defendants and respondents holding that the
Utah Industrial Facilities Development Act (Chapter ~9
Laws of Utah 1967; Title 11, Chapter 17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 Supp., herein referred to as the "Act")
is constitutional and that certain agreements between the
defendants and actions proposed to be taken pursuant
to these agreements including the issuance of rennue
bonds by Tooele County are lawful and valid.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents accept the statement of facts of Appellant with the following clarifications and additions:
-While Tooele County has little available excess housing, presently has a low unemployment rate and would
need to provide additional public services such as schools
and sewage systems, the construction of these new facilities would in itself be a major boon to the ToOPle County
economy (Tr. 20). The proposed electroytic mi1wrals
extraction plant for the production of magnesium, chlorine and related products from the waters of Great Salt
Lake will initially cost between $52 million and $fi0 million. There was no evidence that the defondants conk!
arrange financing in some other way than by the i~sn
ance of industrial revenue bonds although National Lead
Company, one of the partners in The l\Iagiwsinm Projl'ct.
is a substantial company financially. rJ1here was evidt'Jlf'I°
2

I

that cost is a major factor in the establishment of a
project such as this and that savings in financing costs
which might be accomplished by industrial revenue bond
financing is a major inducf~ment to the establishment of
the project in the first instance (Tr. 36). The court can
take jndicial notice of substantial increases in interest
rates nationally, an increase experienced in the municipal
bond market, in the industrial revenue bond market and
in the corporate bond market.
·while Tooele County has agreed (Ex. P-2) to investigate the feasibility of the project and make general
snrveys in this regard, it has not expended tax moneys
for this purpose nor does it expect to do so (Tr. 16, 21-22).
II snch costs are incurred, the County would be reirnlmrsed out of the proceeds of the sale of the revenue
bonds (Para. 4.3, Ex. D-4).
The financing program briefly stated will involve
entering into a lease and agreement between the County
and either Energy Leasing Services, Inc., or The Magnesium Project or their successors or assigns. The lease
form will be substantially in the form of Exhibit D-4.
lf tl1e lease is made with Energy Leasing Services, Inc.,
this wm be done to provide additional financing to the
backers of the project and a sublease substantially in the
form of Exhibit D-7 will be entered into. The County
will also enter into the mortgage and indenture of trust
in substantially the form of Exhibit D-5 and pursuant
thereto will issue revenue bonds secured by a mortgage
on tlw project and by a pledge of the revenues from the
]lroject consisting of the rentals payable under the lease.

3

The bonds will be purchased by Goodbody & Co. punmant to Exhibit P-3. Unconditional guarantee of payment
of the bonds or of the rentals from either The Magnesium
Project, H-K, Inc., National Lead Company or from any
of them may be required if the backers of the project are
not otherwise directly responsible for payment of the
rentals under the lease. The lease continues and the obligation to pay rentals continues in all events until the
principal and interest and all other costs incident to the
bonds (such as trustees' fees, redemptoin premiums, etc.)
are fully paid. The lease can be terminated only when
the bonds are paid or provision for their payment is
satisfactorily made (Article XI of Exhibit D-4).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEBT LIMIT AND BOND ELECTION REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARE NOT VIOLATED BY THE ISSUANCE OF
REVENUEBONDSUNDERTHEACT

The Act specifically provides (11-17-4) that revenue
bonds issued under the Act "shall be limited obligations
of the municipality or county [and] shall not constitute
nor give rise to a general obligation or liability of the
municipality or county or a charge against its general
credit or taxing powers." Further, 11-17-5 provides that
the bonds must be secured by a pledge and assignment
of the revenues out of which the bonds are to be payable
and may be secured by other security devices such as a
mortgage or by a pledge of the lease of the project. rrhe
county or the municipality may also make other covenants or agreements with the bondholders and the lesser
4

of the lease of the project "except that in making any
such agreements or provisions a municipality or county
shall not have the power to obligate itself except with
respect to the project and the application of the revenues
from it and shall not have the power to incur a general
obligation or liability or a charge upon its general credit
or against its taxing powers." To make these restrictions
doubly effective the Act also provides in 11-17-5( 4) that
no breach of any agreement with the bondholders or
with the lessee of a project "shall impose any general
obligation or liability upon the municipality or county
or any charge upon their general credit or against their
taxing pO\Yers."
Respondents have fully complied with these re8trictions. The lease (Ex. D-4) obligates the County to
issue revenue bonds to finance the construction of The
Magnesium Project plant and facilities and to use the
proceeds of the bonds solely for that purpose. The
County is not obligated beyond the amount of bond
proceeds available for the purpose of constructing the
project (Sec. 4.6, Ex. D-4). On the other hand, the lease
obligates the lessee to pay rent equal to the principal
and interest due on the bonds as and when they become
dnc plns any other expenses incident to the issuance and
payment of the bonds including redemption premiums,
trustees' fees and the like (Sec. 5.3 of Ex. D-4). The
obligation to pay this rent is unconditional until all of
the honds are fully paid. This is a so-called "hell and
high water" lease, which gives no excuse for nonpayment
of rent whatsoever. Specifically, there is no excuse if
tl1e project is not completed, if the project is totally
r:rh(~
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destroyed or condemned, if there is a change in any
laws or even if the County fails to perform any of th~
limited agreements it will make.

,

The agreements between the bondholders and the
County are set forth in the mortgage and indenture of
trust (Ex. D-5). Here it is crystal clear that the bond- ,
holders have no rights against the County which would
involve any tax moneys of the County or any of the other
funds belonging to the County other than the funds arising from payment of the rentals by the lessee of the
project. As required by the Act, the bond form at pagP ,
7 of Exhibit D-5 provides specifically that the bonds and
the interest due on the bonds do not and shall newr
constitute an indebtedness of the County nor a charge
against the general credit or taxing powers of the County.
The bonds are to be payable "solely out of the revemws
and other amounts derived out of the sale or leasing of
the Project financed through the issuance of the Bonds
and which has been leased to the Lessee." The provisions
of the mortgage and indenture confirm these limitations
(e.g., Ex. D-5: Sec. 203, p. 24; Sec. 401, p. 34; Sec. 1400,
p. 69).
The effect of the Act and the use of the Act by the
County in connection with The Magnesimn Project is to
authorize issuance of only revenue bonds, limited ohligations issued in the name of the County but cr<>ating
no debt or liability against the County or any tax rnonPY'
of the County.
The bonds fit within the well recognized "special fund
docrtine" which has long been the law of this State anil
6

almost all other states (72 A.L.R. 687; 96 A.L.R. 1385;
] 4G A.L.R 331) and which holds that obligations not payable from tax moneys are not debts within the meaning
of state constitutional debt limit and bond election rerp1irements. In Utah this principle was established in
Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 (1929),
and has been adhered to in the subsequent cases of Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144; Wadsworth
L'. Sa11taq11in City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161; Utah Power
& Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P.2d 1191;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79
P.2<l Gl; and Barlow v. Clearfield City, 1 U.2d 419, 268
P.2d 682. The same principle has been applied and expanded with regard to revenue bonds issued by the state
for university purposes (Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18; Conder v. Unirersity of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 367). The rule
applies \Vhen, as here, the sole source of payment to the
bondholders is the revenues produced from property
purchased out of the proceeds of the bonds or payable
from the property itself. There is no debt created in
the constitutional sense nor is there any requirement
that the taxpayers must approve the issuance of the
bonds. This is so because the bondholders cannot look to
any tax money as a source of payment for the bonds. As
the court stated in Barnes v. Lehi City, supra,
In the instant case, impounding the earnings
of the electric light and power plant in a special
fund which is expressly pledged for the purpose
of maintaining the plant and the payment of the
interest and purchase price installments as they
accrue under the proposed contract casts no addi7

tional burden on the taxpayers of Lehi City ....
The credit of the city is not extended, nor is any
money which is derived from taxation or other
existing sources of revenue expended, in the purchase price or maintenance cost of the plant. The
city cannot be coerced to applying any part of ib
general revenue for the payment of the purchase
price of the plant or for any part of the cost of
maintenance thereof. Id., 279 Pac. at 885.
In this case, the framework under which the financing program will proceed is similarly limited. The bondholders are told and retold that their only source of
payment is the lease revenues paid by the lessee, that
their only remedy is against the fund arising from rentals paid under this lease and against the property comprising the project and its facilities and equipment. Bond
proceeds, not tax money, are nsed to construct the project
The County can in no event be sued for any money judgment if the bonds are not paid nor is it at any time obli
gated to spend any County funds raised from taxation
for the project or for the payment of the bonds. Tlw
face of the bonds themselves will bear this plain restriction (11-17-4(1) ). No one is misled, no debt or liability
of the County is created.
Appellant recognizes the applicability of the special
fund rule, but argues it might be violated if a connt.1
mortgaged property acquired from tax money to secur 1'
industrial revenue bonds. A sufficient answer is that
this will not be the case here as no County funds ha1T
been spent (Tr. 16, 22) and no property purchased by th 1'
County from tax funds will be used for the project. If ,
any funds are spent, the County will be reimbursed oui
8

of thP bond proceeds (Ex. D-4, Sec. 4.3). If any county
or municipality in the future attempted to use tax moneys
or lffoperty purchased from tax moneys without reimhursernent from the bond proceeds, such county or municipality would not be complying with the restrictions
of the Act that a project or a bond issue would not be
a charge against its general credit or taxing powers. In
such a case a court could certainly prohibit the attempted
transaction. This does not make the Act unconstitutional,
but only makes unlawful the actions of a county or
municipality which attempts to violate the Act.
Thus we have here a new application of established
principles of law, but while employed in a different way,
the principles nevertheless remain the same. There is
no violation of Utah Constitution, Article XIV, Sections
3 and 4.
POINT II
THE ACT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A COUNTY OR
CITY TO LEND ITS CREDIT IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 31, UTAH CONSTITUTION.

rro date at least forty states have enacted some type
of industrial promotion legislation. Most of these states
prrmit the use of revenue bond programs to induce indnstry to locate in their state. Only a very few of the
aets have been found nnconstitntional (See Appendix C);
one of these states (Nebraska) later reversed the deci~ion by adoption of a constitutional amendment. Wy111uing, a neighboring state with a constitution and an
indnstrial revenue bond act similar to those in Utah
l1a:-; itnh(•ld its act in three recent cases: Uhls v. State
I

ex rel. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 74; Reed v. City of
Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 69; Powers v. City of Cheyenne, 435
P.2d 448. The most recent decision upholding an industrial revenue bond act is from Oregon: Carruthrrs v.
Port of Astoria, 438 P.2d 725. For a list of cases upholdmg industrial revenue bond acts see Appendix A.

Article VI, Section 31 was adopted after extensive
debate in the Utah Constitutional Convention held in
1895 and has remained unchanged to date. It reads as
follows:
The legislature shall not authorize the State
or any county, city, town, township, district or
other political subdivision of the state to lend
its credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid
of any railroad, telegraph or other private individual or corporate enterprise or undertaking.
A different ''lending of credit" article was first proposed
to the convention by Brigham H. Roberts as follows:

Neither the State of Utah nor any political
subdivision thereof shall become a stockholder in
or loan its credit to nor make any appropriation
for the benefit of any person, company, association or corporation, unless two-thirds of the
qualified voters at a regular election to be Jwld '
shall assent thereto. (I Proceedings of Utah Constitutional Convention 894, hereinafter cited as
"Proceedings")
Apparently because of objections to the possibility of
lending of credit when two-thirds of the voter::; had approved, this proposal was not adopted.
A second proposal by Mr. F,. S. Richards, more n'strictive than the one adopted, reads as follows:
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No appropriation shall be made by this State
nor any political subdivision thereof to any person, corporation, association, or institution, not
under the absolute control of the State, nor shall
the State or any political subdivision thereof give,
lend or pledge its credit for any such person,
corporafaon, association or institution. (I Proceedings at 951)
This proposal, too, was rejected. Note that the prohibition contained in both of these proposals - against the
State or its political subdivisions making any appropriation for the benefit of a private concern - was omitted
from the article finally adopted.
The debate over the Roberts proposal is recorded
011 pages 894 to 929 of the Proceedings, and from pages
951 to 1002 is found the debate on the Richards proposal
and the proposal of C. S. Varian which was eventually
adopted.
Concerning the meaning of "lending of credit," delegate David Evans, who supported the article which was
adopted, said the following:
vVhat is loaning the credit of a State or a
county or a municipality? In short, it means that
if any corporation or enterprise desiring to start
a business and for the purpose of aiding it, the
State endorses or rather guarantees the bond or
paper of such individual or corporation. . . . (I
Proceedings at 953)
Samuel R. Thurman, one of our most distinguished
eonstitntional framers, supported the final article and
had the same understanding of the concept. He said:
11

It is not a question of the State being permitted to make donations and give bonuses from
time to time of the money that the State has in
hand and under its immediate control, and that
too, for purposes which the State believes to be
a public benefit, but it is a question of mortgaging the State, not for the payment of its own debt
but for the payment of the debt of another. (I
Proceedings 979) (Emphasis added)

Mr. Thurman repeatedly ref erred to the idea that tlw
Article's purpose was to prohibit the State or its political subdivisions from guaranteeing the bonds and otlwr
debts of private organizations. But Thurman and other
delegates made it clear that they did not intend to prohibit all aid or assistance to private enterprise.
The evil feared by the framers was that the failure
of private undertakings to which a state lent its credit
would result in eventual resort to the taxing power of
the State. This desire to prevent the use of the taxing
power to pay private debts arose in a day when the rev1inue bond, as distinguished from the general obligation
bond, was virtually unknown. Revenue bonds do not
involve governmental debt as does the general obligation
bond. Revenue bonds under the Utah Industrial Facilities Development Act are paid only with project revenues; they therefore do not obligate the taxing power of
the governmental unit issuing the bonds. ConsequPntl~
the fears of the framers of the constitution that the
taxing power of the State would be called upon do not
exist under the Act we are concerned with here.
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rr11e Iowa Court had a similar understanding of lending of credit when it said in a case involving industrial
revenue bonds :
What is meant herein by a loan of "credit"~
. . . This particular section of our Constitution
was taken bodily from the Constitution of New
York. As a part of the Constitution of New
York, it was the result of past experience in the
history not only of New York, but of other states
as well, whereby aspiring new states had loaned
their credjt freely and extravagantly to corporate
enterprises which had in them much seductive
promise of public good. These enterprises included railways, canals, water powers, etc. The
corporate body in each case was the primary
debtor; the state bccanie the underwriter; it
loaned its credit always with the assurance and
bC'lief that the primary debtor woitld pay. Pursuant to the secondary liabilities, the state became overwhelmed with millions of dollars of indebtedness which never would have been undertaken as a primary indebtedness, and which never
would liavP been permitted by public sentiment,
if it had been known or believed that the secondary liability would become a primary one through
the universal failure of the primary debtor. The
ultimate cry of the surety is: I would not have
become surety i f I had known or believed
that I should have to pay the debt. This is as true
of states as of individuals. It was to remove this
del11sion of sitretyship with its snare of temptation that this section of the Constitution was adopted. It withheld from the constituted authorities
of the state all power or function of suretyship.
Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.\V. 2d 5,
14-15(Iowa19(14) (Emphasis added).
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This same understanding that the "lending of credit"
concept has no application when revenue bonds are involved was expressed by the vVyoming Supreme Court
as follows:
If courts, which take opposite points of view
relative to the lending of credit, can agree that
revenue bonds such as those here involved are
not a general liability of the city and are not
subject to payment through the exercise of the
taxing power, we ought to be justified in adhering
to the principle that the legislature and bondholders themselves, and not the courts, will be responsible for whatever results from this type of financmg.

We have to recognize the inherent right of
parties to contract as they see fit. If a bond purchaser, with his eyes wide open, sees fit to pilrchase revenite bonds ... for the sake of a Federal
tax advantage, he certainly will be on notice of
the fact that there will never be any pecuniary
liability aga1:nst the City ... and that he will be
able to look only to the revenues of the project
and the project property itself for payment of hi8
bonds. With it expressed clearly in the law and
on the face of each bond that neither the credit
nor taxing power of the municipality is pledged,
no bondholder will ever be heard to say he was
deceived or that he thought otherwise.
The constitutional provision we are discn~~
ing precludes a city from loaning or giving it~
credit to or in aid of an individual or corporation.
This does not prohibit a city from aiding or lJC11efiting a corporation, if its credit is not involved.
Licenses and franchises are frequently granted
by cities and counties to individuals and corporations. No doubt the recipients receive aid and a
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benefit, bitt no public credit is involved. Uhls v.
State, sitpra at 83 (Empasis added).
The Oregon Supreme Court expressed it this way:
[T]he rev(~nue bond method of financing could
not have been in the ken of the constitution writers .... The only conclusion that can be drawn
from history is that they were looking for a way
... to prevent exposing the sources of public revenue to potential hazard. Carntthcrs v. Port of Astoria, sitpra, at 728.

rrhP quotes by the Appellant from statements of
delegates Y arian and Richards were made in the context of a discussion of the use of general obligation bonds
or the nse of state suretyship of private bonds, either of
which involves the use of the taxing pm:ver. The quoted
conunents of both delegates refer to the evil sought to
be ended by the lending of credit proviso - ultimate resort to the taxing power if a financed project fails. Considered in context neither dPlegate was asserting that
no aid or assistance should ever be given to private industr~'· rrhis is done in many ways by all governments, ranging from assistance in the form of research on industrial
problems, providing workmen's compensation insurance
through the State Insurance Fund and, of course, broadly
::;peaking, providing the framework of government within
which private industry itself operates. But where there
is no resort to the taxing power, there is no lending of
cn•dit. This is the case here because the Act (11-17-4)
lJl'Ohibits any such recourse as does the mortgage and
ind<'nture involving this particular project (Ex. D-5).
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Appellant insists that if bonds are not paid when
due, the credit of the County will be impaired and relies
on dictum from Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, supra.
As dictum, the language quoted is not persuasive precedent and in fact the recognition in that case of the
special fund doctrine supports Respondents' position. It
should be noted that the credit of Tooele County would
in no way be impaired if there were a failure to pay the
rentals on The Magnesium Project lease. \Vhen the bonds
are initially marketed they are not sold on the basis of
the credit of the municipality as Appellant alleges. The
record shows instead that revenue bonds are sold on the
basis of the financial strength of the company or companies backing the project (Tr. 34). If a failure occurs,
the only credit rating that would be injured vwuld be
that of the private company for whom the project was
constructed and any private guarantors of the payment
of the bonds.
In addition, contrary to the dictum of Justice Folland in the lVadsworth case that "no prudent city will
permit its promise to pay to go unfulfilled where it has
received and enjoyed the fruits of the obligation," a mort
recent Utah case has held that only a legal obligation
and charge against the city can be paid by the city. In
State v. Spring City, 123 Utah 471, 260 P.2d 527, this
court held that even though the city had sold and used
the proceeds of bonds which the court declared were il
legal and thus "enjoyed the fruits of the obligation,'' the
city could not be compelled to repay the bond purchasers.
Thus Tooele County, here, could insist on the strict appllcation of the provisions of the Act and of the mortgage
16

and indenture relating to this project and refuse to make
payment of the bonds even if they went into default.
[ndeed it is not an overstatement to say that the courts
would prohibit the County from attempting to repay any
of the bonds since the County has no legal obligation to
do so.
Appellant quotes from the Ohio case of State v.
Brand, 197 N.E.2d 328 to the effect that the borrowing
power of the state would be lessened and thus the burden
on the tax power of the state would be greater. This
theory cannot be assumed without evidence and economic
analysis. Appellant has made no showing that the borrowing power of the state will be lessened nor has he
related a lessened borrowing power to a greater burden
on the taxing power. (It would appear that the burden
of taxes would be less over the long run if there were
no borrowing). The trial did establish instead that the
revenue bonds would be issued not on the credit rating
of the County but on the credit rating of the private companies involved in the project. If the project were to
fail, only the credit of the companies and its private
guarantors would be affected. Thus the suggestion in
Appellant's brief that interest rates on other tax free
honds "likely will be increased" and that governmental
nnits "may have to pay higher rates of interest on 'legiti1uate' bonds issued to finance public improvements" beeanse of the use of industrial revenue bonds are merely
unsupported suppositions. Even if this were the case,
1l1at would not involve a lending of credit in the constitutional sense, for revenue bonds are neither a charge
:1gainst any tax moneys or an obligation payable directly
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or indirectly out of tax moneys. To the extent that thP
Idaho, Ohio and Nebraska Supreme Courts reached contrary views in the cases cited by Appellant, we disagree
with the conclusions reached and point out, again, that
these cases stand alone against the many other cases :mpporting this type of financing.
It is, of course, true that the financing cost is les~
on thPse type of bonds because nnder present federal
income tax laws and by the provisions of the Act (11-1710) interest on these bonds is exempt from income taxation. Furthermore, the record indicates that in some
cases perhaps a greater percentage of the cost of a project conld be financed (Tr. 73), but neither of these advantages involve in any way an obligation assumed by
the state or any county or city. The name of the County
as the issncr of the bonds is certainly not the same as
the use of its credit.

As discussed above, the "lending of credit" sought
to be prohibited by the framers of the Utah constitution
was public suretyship of private securities or assumption
of private obligations by the public 'vith the resulting
resort to the taxing power of the public agency in tlw
event of private failures. rrhe framers showed no int<•nt
that "lending of credit" vvas to have the expanded nwaning suggested by the Idaho and Nebraska cases. On the
contrary, "lending of credit" is not involved in rewnui·
bond financing and the framers intended that private·
enterprise could be be>nefitted hy public action wlwn
lending of credit is not involved. This court should foll<n1·
the intent of the framers of our constitution by finding
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tl1at when no resort can he had to the taxing power of
tlw puhlic agency, Toot>le County in this case, there is
no violation of Article VI, Section 31.
POINT III
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC PURPOSE FOR
THE ACT.

In many of the cases involving industrial promotion
legislation, attacks have been made on the basis that the
legislation involves a use of public agencies or public
funds or public property in furtherance of private purposes and, thus, it is not for a "public purpose." SometimPs this principle is asserted to be founded in the
"lending of credit" provisions of state constitutions.
Other courts discuss it in terms of a general constitutional principle that there is a public sphere within which
the legislature may act and a private sphere in which
the legislature may not act. Still other courts discuss this
in terms of an application of the "due process" clauses
of state constitutions and of the United States Constitution. See Noh>, 1967 Utah Law Review 455; 19 Vand. L.
Rev. 25 (1965).
rrhe lending of credit provision of our constitution
is discussed in Point II of this brief, where we pointed
out there is no lending of credit because the Act involves
only revt>nue bonds which do not obligate the credit of
th<· County and which do not permit any charge on the
taxing power. There being no lending of credit, we need
not then go to the question of whether there can be a
lending of credit if it is for a public purpose as was
~nggested in the cases of Bailey v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah
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184, 240 Pac. 454, and Wallberg v. Utah Pitblic Welfare
Comm., 115 Utah 242, 203 P.2d 935. In the former case
this court found a public purpose when public fun<l.s
were used to assist the farming industry by the employment of county farm agents and, in the latter case, that
Article VI, Sec. 31, was not violated by the imposition
of a lien on land ovmed by recipients of public welfare.
Both statutes were held to be for a valid public purpose.
With respect to the argument that there is an implied constitutional limitation on the powers of the legislature, we suggest that this is wholly foreign to previous
interpretations of our state constitution by this court.
In Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d 359, 37 4 P.2d 516, this court
stated:
Our Legislature is directly representative of
the people of the sovereign state, and thus had inherently all of the powers of government excevt
as otherwise specified by the State Constitution .
. . . Therefore, it can do any act or perform any
function of government not specifically prohibited
by the State Constitution.
Our state constitution being then a limitation on power,
not a grant of power, there is no possibility of implied
constitutional limitations of the kind suggested.
The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitu
tion was formerly used in several cases to strike doWll
state legistlation. See, for example, Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875). But recent cases have held that
state legislatures may properly enact economic legisl11·
tion which regulates the property rights of its citizens.
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Carmichael v. Soitthern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,
SL L.Ed. 1245 (1937). This deference to legislative judgment is illustrated in a case involving an industrial promotion act enacted by the State of Mississippi in which
the United States Supreme Court found no substantial
federal question to be involved (Albritton v. City of
Winona, 303 U.S. 627). It appears clear that the present
cas~: does not present any issue under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution except, possibly,
on the question of the tax exemption provisions of the
Act, which are discussed in Point V of this brief.
Turning next to public purpose as a part of due
process under state constitutions, most state courts have
had no difficulty in finding a public purpose sustaining
industrial development legislation (Roe v. K ervick, 42
N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834; City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378
l\fich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460; Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark.
G7, 334 S:\V .2d 633; Roan v. Connecticut Indi1,strial Building Commission, 189 A.2d 399; Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, supra. See other cases collected in Appendix B).
There is a clear trend toward reversing the 19th Century
<lodrines of limitations on the legislature (e.g. Sharpless
u. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Arn. Dec. 759
(1853)) to the modern recognition that state government
i11 the exercise of its police powers must consider and
become involved in the economic aspects of our society
for the general welfare of all. As the Delaware court
~tatPd:

Recent decisions in other jurisdictions, we
think, demonstrate a growing tendency on the
part of lPgislatures and courts to expand the con-
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cept of public purpose beyond the narrow limits
represented by the earlier decisions . . . . In re
Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 366, 177 A.2d 205,
at 214.
There is also a firmly established rule that courts defer
to the determination of the legislature as to what i8 a
proper public purpose and what type of legislation is
needed for the public good. Courts will intervene only in
a "plain case of departure from every public purpose
which could reasonably be conceived." (Carmichael v.
Southern Coal and Coke Co., supra). See also, Albritton
v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799; State v.
City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71. In Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80,
the rule was stated as follows:
In enacting the statute under which the present venture is undertaken, the legislature deemed
the acquisition and ownership by a city of an
"industrial building" to be a public project. Tlw
legislative determination of what is a public purpose will not be interfered with by the courts
unless the judicial mind concedes it be without
reasonable relation to the public interest or welfare and to be within the scope of legitimate government. The consensus of modern legislative anJ
judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of actiYities which may be classed as involving a publir
purpose . . . . It reaches perhaps its broadest
extent under the view that economic welfare is om
of the main concerns of city, state and the federal
governments.
This general principle is in line with earlier decisions of this court. In Lehi City v. M eiling, 87 U tall 237,
48 P.2d 530, this court stated:
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It is one of the objects of government to promote the public ~welfare of the state and provide
for the material prosperity of its people. It is for
the Legislature to determine the manner and extent to which it will exercise this function of
government, and its determination upon that point
is limited by its own discretion, and is beyond the
interference of the courts. Id., 48 P.2d at 535.
In the instant case there is ample evidence to show
that in passing the Act the Legislature was acting within
its proper sphere in promoting and protecting the public
health, welfare and morals. The Act is referred to as
relating to "industrial development," and Section 1 of
the Act specifies that it "shall be for the purpose of
achieving greater industrial development in the State of
Utah." The trial court found that a valid and substantial
public purpose was contemplated by the Legislature in
the enactment of the Act (Findings, para. 15) and by the
8oard of Commissioners of Tooele County in its proposed
implementation of the provisions of the Act (Findings,
para. 13).
Following the doctrine set forth in Lehi City v.
M eiling, supra, this court should uphold the legislation,
indulging the usual presumptions in its favor. Certainly
the enactment here is not a "clear and demonstrable
mmrpation of power" (Lehi City v. M eiling, 48 P.2d at
535) which the court should invalidate. The trial court's
finding that "there is a valid and substantial public purpose and public benefit to the County subserved by the
issuance of the proposed revenue bonds and the con1<trnction of the project from the proceeds of the sale
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thereof" (Finding, para. 14) directly corroborates the
legislature's exercise of its discretion. For this reason,
we shall only briefly highlight the supporting evidence
on this point in the record.
The evidence shows that between $50 million and
$60 million will be spent in initial construction of the
project, including some $10 million of supplies to be obtained from Utah sources; that peak employment during
construction will be between 800 and 1,000 construction
workers and that the plant, when in operation, will require 300 employees with an annual payroll of $3,360,000
or $2,960,000 after fringe benefits are deducted (Tr. 2728, 53, 57; Ex. D-13). Yearly purchases from Utah
sources will amount to $3,230,000 (Exs. D-6, D-11, D-12).
Professor Iver Bradley of the University of Utah, an
experienced statistician and economist, applied the results of his economic research to these figures and determined that the wage payments and Utah purchases of
supplies by the project will increase the total yearly
household income to Utah households by $6,760,000 (Tr.
53; Ex. D-12) and that the project payroll will represent a 32% increase in the wages paid in Utah in the
chemical manufacturing sector of our economy (Tr. 55;
Ex. D-13). Additional economic benefits not measured
by the study will be derived from expenditures of $2
million in the state each year for electrical energy (Tr.
29, 54); transportation expenditures (Tr. 30, 54); expenditures of approximately $500,000 a year in state and
local taxes and $163,000 per year in state land rentals
and royalties (Tr. 31, 58), and the spurt to tll(~ economy
caused by the initial construction of the project err. 5724

58). It is also likely that new industries using magnesium,
chlorine, gypsum and other by-products produced by The
Magnesium Project will locate in Utah (Tr. 31, 54).
The economic benefits above referred to become even
more significant when the present Utah and Tooele County economies are observed. Commissioner R. Sterling
Halladay, of the Board of Commissioners of Tooele
County, testified (Tr. 19-20):
THE vVITNESS: The employment in our County, we're very much concerned. A very high
percent of our employment is Federal employment, while our economy is good because [of
the present] employment that we enjoy, it
could be wiped out by the stroke of a pen
overnight, and we would be in a very bad
circumstance, both with regards to the private individual, as well as all of our municipalities and your county government is concerned. I'm not sure as to the percentage of
Federal employment, but I'm - it must be
over 50% Federal employment here in this
county [Exhibit D-16 shows that over 80%
of the wage and salary payments in the years
1962 to 1965 came from government sources].
Professor R. Thayne Robson, of the University of
Utah Bureau of Economic and Business Research, testified that the economy of the State of Utah needs to
grow by 14,000 to 15,000 new jobs a year to absorb the
normal increase in the labor force and to re-employ
}Jersons displaced in other industries and should grow by
15,000 to 18,000 jobs per year to provide the needed
growth rate for Utah's econom~'. Over the past 5 years
the economy has not grffwn sufficiently to absorb these
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normal increases and, consequently, there has been a
substantial migration out of the state to find jobs (Tr.
78-79).
In Tooele County more of the personal income
(84.4%) comes from wages and salaries than in the state
as a whole (69.7% ), and government accounts for 69.9%
of the total as compared to a state-wide average of
19.6% (Ex. D-14). Similar information is shown on Exhibits D-15 and D-16. Exhibits D-17 and D-18 indicate
the relatively small share of the Tooele County economy
occupied by manufacturing with the actual number of
manufacturing establishments declining between 1958 and
1963 and the number employed in manufacturing being
less in 1963 than in 1939. Other information on Tooele
County is shown on Exhibits D-19 and D-20 relating to
taxes and Exhibit D-21 relating to some aspects of the
Tooele population.
Professor Robson also testified that the short-term
effect of The Magnesium Project during the construction
period "would be a great boost and boom for the Utah
economy" (Tr. 85) and that the long-term effect on
Tooele County and the State of Utah "would be very
substantial and very significant" (Tr. 86).
Certainly on this evidence and similar evidence relating to the State as a whole, the Tooele County Commission and the Legislature of the State of Utah were
reasonable in concluding that financing of private industry through the use of industrial revenue bonds was
a proper public activity and for the public benefit. Au-
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thorization of use of these income tax exempt revenue
bonds affords a relatively simple means by which the
goals of private industry and public bodies can be accomplished to their mutual benefit. We need not and do
not in this case contend that this legislation is a panacea
for all the economic problems of the State or of Tooele
County, but clearly if this legislation is upheld it does
place Utah on an even basis with other states in the
competition for new jobs and increased economic prosperity (Tr. 71). There is a proper public purpose m
this type of legislation and it should be sustained.
POINT IV
THE ACT PROPERLY DELEGATES POWERS TO
CITIES AND COUNTIES, APPLIES UNIFORMLY,
GRANTS NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, DELEGATES
TO NO SPECIAL COMMISSION AND REQUIRES
BOND PROCEEDS TO BE USED FOR PROPER
PURPOSES.

Appellant in Points II, III and VI of his brief alleges violation of several constitutional provisions which
we ~will discuss under this general point.
(A) Delegation of Pou;ers. Unless specifically limited by the state constitution, the legislature has all
powers of government (vVood 1'. Budge, supra; Lehi City
v. Jlfeiling, s1tpra; Salt Lalce City v. Christensen Co., 34
Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898). In exercising this power, it can delegate to cities and counties such
authority as it deems advisable. This does not violate any
Rl"Jmration of powers concept of Article V, Section 1,
for the cities and counties within the scope of their dele27

gated powers act as arms of the state. This court stated
in Nowers v. Oakden, 110 Utah 25, 169 P.2d 108 at 113:
County Commissioners are legislative as well as
executive bodies. The delegation of legislative or
quasi legislative powers to such a body could not
be questioned ....
vVith regard to cities, the legislature is not restricted
to the subjects set forth in Article XI, Section 5. This
court stated in Wadsworth v. Santaqitin City, sitpra, 28
P.2d at 168-69:
The power granted in the amendment [to
Article XI, Section 5] to cities forming their own
charters, while taking such cities out of the orbit
of le.gislative action as to municipal and local
affairs, is no limitation on the power of the legislature with respect to the organization of other
cities and the conferring of power on them by
general law.
Thus, it cannot be said that the lack of specific reference
to industrial revenue bond financing in Article XI, Section 5, negates the existence of such authority. ThP
legislature can supply this authority which it has donr
by the adoption of the Act here in question. Na nee r.
Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773,
does not conflict with this conclusion for the holding there
was that a city ordinance on civil rights was invalid because civil rights authority was neither granted by Article XI, Section 5, nor was it authorized by any statute.
This is not a holding that Article XI, Sec. 5 is the onl,vsource of city powers.
vVe recognize that a delegation by the legislatlu·(·
must be limited by proper standards, but such standards
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are set forth in the Act. The most basic of these is
found in 11-17-1 that the Act is for the purpose of
"achieving greater industrial development in the State
of Utah." The city or county must act in promoting this
purpose so as not to give rise to a general obligation or
liability of the city or county or a charge against its
general credit or taxing powers. It must act reasonably
in determining appropriate terms for the leases, providing for adequate security for the bonds, providing for
proper disposition of the proceeds of the bonds and carrying out the purposes of the Act for the public benefit
of the municipality or county involved. Necessarily, the
municipality or county must be granted considerable
discretion, for these projects will vary greatly in type
and extent. Lease provisions applicable in one situation
may not be appropriate in another. Similar discretion
is exercised by officials of cities and counties every day
nndcr various statutes and in various circumstances. See
Tltah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, supra, 74 P.2d
at 1196.
Appellant specifically points to the fact that the Act
fails to provide the maximum price at which revenue
bonds issued under the Act may be sold or a maximum
interest rate on the bonds. Since the bonds are not
an obligation of the city or county and will be paid by
the company involved in the project, it is entirely apIJropriate for the legislature to permit the market place
to determine the rate of interest and the price of the
bonds.
Section 11-17-3 of the Act provides that a project
1nust be located ·within the State of Utah and "may be
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located within or partially within" the municipality or
county which is sponsoring the project. Appellant contends this constitutes an improper delegation even though
it is clear that the project here will be located entirely
within Tooele County (Tr. 27). We see nothing wrong
in permitting a city or county to so act so long as they
act reasonably and within the purposes of the Act. Based
on the evidence discussed in Point III, it would appear
that the City of Tooele or the City of Grantsville will
receive many of the benefits which will inure to Tooele
County from the establishment of the project and should
be permitted to sponsor such a project. If, however,
Tooele County sponsored a project located near St.
George, the County Commissioners might well be
acting unreasonably and, thus, beyond the authority of
the Act. \¥ e also note that the phrase could be construed as requiring projects to be at least partially ·within
the municipality or county. The phrase "may be locatrd
within or partially within, such municipality or county"
could be construed to mean that the municipality or
county has discretion as to the two named alternatives,
that is, either within or partially within but no other.
We suggest but do not endorse such a construction, for
we believe it would unduly and unnecessarily restrict the
location of industry around cities and counties which
benefit from the establishment of such an industrial
project.
The question of location and, indeed, the essence of
the question of delegation is adequately answered by
State v. City of Pittsbitrg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 at
78-79. An industrial revenue bond act authorizing loca30

tion of projects "in any city or its environs, without
limitation as to distance" was not an improper delegation, the court held. The legislature must fix general
standards, but "the filling in of details must, in the very
nature of things, be left to the local authorities." The
conrt noted "the legislature and the people have the right
to assume that public officials will exercise their express
and implied powers fairly, honestly and reasonably."
(B) Uniformity, No Special Privileges, Vagueness.
Pointing to Article VI, Section 26 (private or special
laws), or in Federal constitutional terms, equal protection of the laws, Appellant argues that the Act constitutes special legislation. He asserts there is no reasonable basis for the exclusion of public utilities as a project
which could be financed under the Act and suggests that
only telephone, electric and gas utilities are so excluded.
We read Section 11-17-2(2) as excluding all public utilities as defined in Section 54-2-1. A classification between
public utilities and other types of business or industry
is certainly reasonable and has been customarily recognized. These types of companies traditionally subject to
regulation by the Public Service Commission should continue to be so regulated and should not become involved
with cities or counties in a project under the Act. Note,
also, that the exclusion applies generally without exception to all utilities and thus operates uniformly.

This also answers . Acppellant's assertion that exemption of the revenue bonds from the Uniform Commercial
Code violates the uniformity provisions. The Commereial Code itself contains numerous exclusions from its
operation. Here another exclusion applies to all bonds
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issued under the Act and this is applied uniformly and
equally without discrimination of any kind. This same
reason justifies the exemption of projects under the Act
from the competitive bidding laws plus the added reason
that there is no need for competitive bidding when government does not pay the bill. "\Ve can assume that the
private industry involved in the project, which is paying
the bill, will see to it that the lowest possible prices for
construction and for financing are obtained.
Finally, Appellant contends that there is broad discretion given to a city or county as to what industry it
would sponsor under the Act. The mere fact that a
county is free to negotiate with whom it pleases does
not violate any constitutional guarantee. The Act is
general by its terms and would permit any industrial
enterprise, except public utilities, to lease a project from
the county. The county itself, as a subdivision of state
government, is left with legislative powers which it may
use in determining the method and procedure it will follow in its use of the Act. See N owe rs v. Oakden, siipra,
and see generally State v. ]}Jason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d
920; Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 U.2d 355,
393 P.2d 391; 111 arqitardt v. Weber Coimty, 360 F.2d lGS.
See also Note, 1967 Utah Law Review 431. In the latter
two cases the courts held that the act in question was
non-discriminatory in terms and there was no violation
of equal protection guarantees as a result of discrimination in application of the act when the discrimination
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was not "intentional and systematic." In State v. Demus,
135 S.E. 2d 352 (vV. Va. 1964), industrial promotion legislation was sustained, the court holding that there is no
violation of equal protection guarantees even if some
persons are incidentally benefitted more than others in
achieving the purposes of the legislation. See also Green
v. City of JJJt. Pleasant, supra; Roe v. Kervick, supra;
and State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414.
Appellant points to no particular provision of the
Act which he considers vague, ambiguous or uncertain
and our reading of the Act does not indicate any vagueness, ambiguity or uncertainty whatsoever. This court
has established the rules concerning vagueness of statutes in several cases inclr. ding N owe rs v. Oakden, supra,
(no unconstitutional vagueness if the Act "when constrned with related sections, conveys a definite meaning
to 'those whose duty it is to execute it'") ; Kent Club v.
Toronto, 6 U.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870; Tygesen v. Magna
Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127, 131 (Courts will
not declare an act invalid "because it has not been expressed as aptly or clearly as it could have been had
uifforent terms been used . . . . Only when it is impossihle to resolve the donbts ·will an act be declared invalid
for uncertainty or vagueness.").
( C) I rr<'vocablc Franchise. On the basis of Article
I, Se~. 23, Utah Constitution, Appellant objects to Section 11-17-13 of the Act. This section merely provides
that the legislature will not make changes in the Act
whieh would affect outstanding bonds issued under the
Act so as to "alter, m1pair or limit the rights thereby
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vested until the bonds ... are fully met and discharged."
But the provision goes on to make it clear that amendments may be made "if and when adequate provision
shall be made by law for the protection of the holders
of the bonds or persons entering into contracts with any
county or municipality." Thus the purpose and effect of
the provision is not to grant an irrevocable franchise or
privilege, but to reasonably protect contracts which have
been made. Attempted amendments which would impair
vested contract rights of bondholders or others would
undonbtedly violate Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution. See also Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers,
114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S.
930, where a 99 year lease of state property was held
not to constitute an irrevocable franchise, privilege or
immunity. It would appear that Appellant concedes, and
quite properly, that the principles of that case sustain
leases made under the Act here in question.
(D) Special Commissio11. Article VI, Section 29,
Utah Constitution, prohibits delegation by the legislature
to any special commission, corporation or association
power to perform any municipal function. The municipal
function under the Act here involved is to induce industry to locate in the municipality by erecting a project,
not to operate a project. Indeed the municipality or
county is prohibited from operating a project. There is
no delegation of any municipal function to a private company leasing property from the city or county under tl111
Act since the company merely operates a plant erecte<l
by a city or county which has performed its function of
inducing industry to locate in the area. The compan:
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w11ile operating property, title to which is vested in the
county or municipality, in doing so pursuant to a lease,
the terms of which are controlled by the county or municipality. For the same reason there is no delegation
to a trustee or receiver who might operate the property
if a default occurs in the bonds. These same questions
were discussed and a virtually identical constitutional
provision was construed by the Wyoming Supreme Court
in Uhls v. State, sitpra, 429 P.2d at 84-85. The court
there held that this constitutional provision is designed
"to protect against the exercise of the taxing power and
other purely municipal functions by officials not subject
to the people's control." This result is consistent with
interpretations by this court of Article VI, Section 29.
See Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Utah 536,
271 Pac. 961 at 972.

Also note that there is in reality no delegation under
the Act except to municipalities and counties. Accordingly, cases such as Carter v. Beaver County Service Area
No. 1. 16 U.2d 280, 399 P.2d 440, Backman v. Salt Lake
Cowdy, 13 U.2d 412, 375 P.2d 756, and State Water Pollntion Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 U.2d 247, 311
P.2d 370, are distinguishable because in all those cases
a special commission or district or state agency had been
crPated to which powers had been delegated. The powers
granted by the Industrial Facilities Development Act are
granted without discrimination to "each municipality and
each county." The Act thus does not constitute an interfen•nce ·with a municipality or count~r, but extends a privil<'g't' which is permissible as this court noted in Merkley
c. State Tax Comm'n., 11 U.2d 336, 358 P.2d 991.
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(E) Use of Borrowed Moneys. Article XIV, Section
5, of the Utah Constitution is not violated by the Act.
It requires moneys borrowed by a legal subdivision of
the State to be used "solely for the purpose specified in
the law authorizing the loan." The Act here expressly
authorizes bond proceeds to be used only for industrial
development. The lease and mortgage and indenture
of trust, Exlubits D-4 and D-5, specifically require the
Respondents to use the bond proceeds only for the purposes specified in the Act which, in this case, will be construction of this industrial project. Only if the bond
proceeds are actually used for purposes not authorized
by law will the constitutional provision be violated and,
should that occur, the courts may take action to prohibit
the diversion. There is obviously nothing in the Act
itself which authorizes any diversion.
POINT V
PROPERLY INTERPRETED, THE ACT DOES NOT
GRANT IMPERMISSIBLE TAX EXEMPTIONS.

Section 11-17-10 of the Act provides as follows:
All property acquired or held by the count:1
or municipality under this act is declared to he
public property used for essential public and governmental purposes; and all such property and
bonds issued under this act and the income from
them are exempt from all taxes imposed by the
state of Utah, any county, any municipality, or
any other political snbdivison of the state. This
exemption shall not extend to the interests of any
private person, firm, association, partnership, corporation or other private business entity in such
property or in any other property such busines~
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entity may place upon or use in connection with
any project, all of which shall be subject to the
provisions of section 59-13-73 and all other applicable laws, nor to any income of such private
business entity, which, except as provided in this
section for such bonds and the income from them,
shall be subject to all applicable laws regarding
the taxing of such income.
Appellant in Point V of his brief interprets the
above section to grant at least a partial exemption from
the property tax. This is a strained interpretation to
reach a possibly unconstitutional result and violates the
established canon of construction that laws should be
interpreted to avoid constitutional questions.
Consider for the moment the situation if the Act did
not contain a section such as 11-17-10. Had that been
true, the private company leasing an industrial plant
and equipment from a city or county could very properly
rlaim a property tax exemption for county owned property as expressly provided in Article XIII, Section 2 of
the Utah Constitution because the title to the plant and
eqniprnent remains in the county or city until the bonds
are paid and the options to purchase provided for in
the lease are exercised. To avoid this result the legislature~ recognized the argument, but said instead that the
private company would pay the same amount as it would
otherwise pay in property tax by requiring application
of Section 59-13-73 to the property the private company
"may place upon or use in connection with any project."
'rhP tax is "in the same amount and to the same extent
a1; the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor
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or user were the owner thereof" (59-13-74). A fair reading of the privilege and use tax sections referred to make
it clear that the value, tenure, title or ownership of the
interest of the private business in the otherwise tax exempt property is irrelevant and that the tax is imposed
whenever there is possession or other beneficial use by
a private party. This ·was the construction adopted by
this court in Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson,
supra, which case was relied on and approved in Marquardt v. Weber County, 360 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1966).
A similar "in lieu of property tax" provision was
upheld in Powers v. City of Cheyenne, sitpra. Appellant's
claim that "likely" the tax imposed would not be the
same and that each individual assessor would apply the
law differently can be answered simply by this court
declaring that the tax under 59-13-73 is to be imposed
on project lessees under the Act on the same basis as if
the lessee were paying a property tax on property, title
to which is owned by it. Our statute is is no way similar
to the Virginia statute involved in Industrial Development Authority v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d 326,
where the statute provided for rental payments in lieu
of property taxes and granted the local authority pmver
to agree "at any time" to a definite sum to be paid for
such purpose. The opportunity for discrimination in such
a statute is self-evident.
Some states have granted a clear tax exemption
which has been upheld. See State ·v. Demits, 135 R.E.2d
352 (W.Va. 1964); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62
N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920. Utah chose, instead, to impose a
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tax in lieu of property tax and to reqmre payment of
the usnal corporate franchise tax on income. There can
be no constitutional infirmity in this approach under
Sections 2, 3, or 10 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution. Since there is no exemption, there is no discrimination or inequality which could raise any question under
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
or under similar provisions of our state constitution.
Appellant makes no objection to the exemption of
the revenue bonds themselves from property taxation or
to exemption of the interest on the revenue bonds from
income taxation. Exemption of intangible property such
as bonds from property taxation is expressly authorized
by Article XIII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution.
Exemption from income tax of the interest on bonds issued by municipalities and other governmental agencies
is in line with long-standing state policy (See 59-14-4
(2) ( d); 11-14-14) uniformly applied and the exemption
in the Act is only a specific application of this general
state policy.
POINT VI
INVESTMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN REVENUE
BONDS ISSUED UNDER THE ACT IS PERMISSIBLE.

The trial court held that because the County had
d(~termined not to purchase or invest in any of the bonds
(Exhibit P-2) the question was not properly before the
court and was not determined (Conclusions of Law, para.
:\(a); Declaratory Judgment and Decree, para. 2). Appellant nonetheless raises the question again suggesting
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that a state investment in these revenue bonds would
constitute an assumption of the debt of a county contrary to Article XIV, Section 6, Utah Constitution. This
ignores the plain fact of such a transaction that the state
rather than assuming debt would become a creditor at
the time of the purchase of the bonds, not a debtor. The
state would not be obligated to pay the debt but as a
creditor would receive interest and be entitled to receive
the principal when it came due. Furthermore, because
of the "special fund doctrine" referred to in POINT I,
the County is not the debtor. The state, like any other
bondholder, could look only to the revenues from the
project for payment of the bond and the property comprising the project which is mortgaged as additional
security.
If Appellant intends to suggest that any investment
by a public agency in securities, including securities which
a private corporation is required to pay, is unconstitutional, the claim was set to rest by this court in State
Land Board v. State Finance Commission, 12 U.2d 265,
365 P.2d 213. Andres v. First Arkansas Development
Finance Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W. 2d 97 upheld state
investment in industrial development bonds. See also
Industrial Development Aitthority v. Eastern Kentif;cky
Regional Planning Conimission, 332 S.W.2d 27 4 and
Halbert v. Helena-West Helena Inditstrial Development
Corp., 226 Ark. 620, 291 S.W.2d 802. The authorization
of investment by the act is no more than that intended
in the statute considered in the Land Board case, and
should be treated as such by this court.
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If, however, the court is concerned with the constitutionality of this section, it is clearly severable from
the remainder of the Act. The primary purpose of the
Act is to provide a financing method to induce private
industry to locate in Utah. Enhanced marketability of the
bonds issued to accomplish this purpose by permitting
sale to public agencies is certainly a subordinate matter
not essential to the major purpose of the Act and if defective should be severed from the remainder of the Act.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we submit that the Utah
Industrial Facilities Development Act is in all respects
valid and constitutional and that the proposed actions of
the respondents here in operating pursuant to this Act
should be declared to be lawful in all respects. To arrive
at this result the court need not and should not indulge
in philosophical speculations as to the desirability of
this type of legislation. That decision was made by the
legislature which recognized that industrial development
for this state is of vital concern. Had they felt otherwise they would not have established in 1965 the Utah
State Industrial Promotion Board, whose assignment
is specifically to induce industry to locate in this state.
11he Act here in question provides another tool with which
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this Board can accomplish its purposes enabling it to
compete on a more equal basjs with other states whose
courts have already approved this type of legislation.
We submit that the decision below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
H. R. WALDO, JR.
J. WENDELL BAYLES
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
800 Walker Bank Buildjng
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
GORDON HALL
Tooele County Attorney
Tooele County Courthouse
Tooele, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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APPENDIX A
The following is a list of cases upholding the constitutionality of legislation authorizing industrial development revenue bond financing:
ALABAMA

Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49,
57 So. 2d 629 (1952) (no "lending of
credit" when revenue bonds are issued)
In re Opinion of the Justices, 256 Ala.
162, 53 So. 2d 840 (1951) (no "lending
of credit" when revenue bonds are issued)

ARKANSAS

Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d
633 (1960) (no "lending of credit" when
revenue bonds are issued)

GEORGIA

Smith v. State, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d 113
(1961) (by local constitutional amendment)

IOWA

Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa
1184, 131 N.W.2d 5 (1964) (no "lending
of credit" when revenue bonds are issued)

KANSAS

State ex rel. Ferguson v. City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 (1961)
(no "lending of credit" when revenue
bonds are issued)

KENTUCKY

Gregory v. City of Lewisport, 369 S.W.2d
133 (Ky. 1963) (no "lending of credit"
when revenue bonds are issued)
Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468,
232 S.W.2d 80 (1950) (no "lending of
credit" when revenue bonds are issued)

LOUISIANA

Hebert v. Police Jury, 200 So. 2d 877
(La. 1967) (no "lending of credit" when
revenue bonds are issued; constitutional
authorization)

MAINE

Opinion of the Justices, 210 A.2d 683 (Me.
1965) (limited approval)

MICHIGAN

City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273,
144 N.W.2d 460 (1966) (no "lending of
credit" when revenue bonds are issued)
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MISSOURI

State ex rel. City of El Dorado Springs v.
Holman, 363 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1962)
(constitutional amendment authorizes
both general obligation and revenue
bonds)

NEBRASKA

State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962)
(constitutional amendment authorizing
industrial revenue bonds said by the
court to be for private purposes)

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Opinion of the Justices, 209 A.2d 474 (N.
H. 1965)

NEW MEXICO

Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M.
18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956)

NORTH DAKOTA

Gripentrog v. City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W.
2d 230 (N.D. 1964)

OKLAHOMA

Harrison v. Claybrook, 372 P.2d 602 (Okla.
1962)

OREGON

Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, ____ Ore. ____ ,
438 P .2d 725 (1968) (no "lending of
credit" when revenue bonds are issued)

SOUTH CAROLINA

Elliott v. McNair, ____ S.C. ____ , 156 S.E.2d
421 (1967) (no "lending of credit" when
revenue bonds are issued)

TENNESSEE

West v. Industrial Development Bd., 206
Tenn. 154, 332 S.W.2d 201 (1960) (no
"lending of credit" when revenue bonds
are issued)
Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn.
46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951) (no "lending
of credit" when revenue bonds are issued; distinguished two prior Tennessee
cases holding unconstitutional general
obligation bond programs)

VIRGINIA

Fairfax County Indus. Dev. Auth'y v.
Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 150 S.E.2d 87
(1966) (no "lending of credit" when
revenue bonds are issued)
Industrial Dev. Auth'y of Chesapeake v.
Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d 326
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(1967) (constitutional except for tax
provision)
WEST VIRGINIA

State ex rel. County Court v. Demus, 148
W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352 (1964) (no
"lending of credit" when revenue bonds
are issued)

WISCONSIN

State v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d 57, 148 N.W.
2d 683 (1967) (no "lending of credit"
when revenue bonds are issued)

WYOMING

Uhls v. State, 429 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1967)
(no "lending of credit" when revenue
bonds are issued)
Reed v. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 69
(Wyo. 1967) (no "lending of credit"
when revenue bonds are issued)
Powers v. City of Cheyenne, 435 P.2d 448
(Wyo. 1967) (no "lending of credit"
when revenue bonds are issued)
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APPENDIX B
The following is a list of caseR which, in addition to
those cases listed in Appendix A, have upheld legislation authorizing governmental programs of promoting
industrial development as having a public purpose:
ALABAMA

Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49
So. 2d 175 (1950)

ALASKA

De Armond v. Alaska State Development
Corporation, 376 P.2d 717 (Alas. 1962)

ARKANSAS

Myhand v. Erwin, 231 Ark. 444, 330 S.W.
2d 68 (1959)
Hackler v. Baker, 233 Ark. 690, 346 S.W.
2d 677 ( 1961) (constitutional amendment authorizes both general obligation
and revenue bonds)

CONNECTICUT

Roan v. Connecticut Indus. Bldg. Comm'n,
150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 ( 1963)

DELAWARE

In re Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 366,
177 A.2d 205 (1962)

KENTUCKY

Industrial Dev. Auth'y v. Eastern Ky. Regional Planning Comm'n, 332 S.W.2d
274 (Ky. 1960)
Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648
(Ky. 1956)

LOUISIANA

Miller v. Police Jury, 266 La. 8, 74 So. 2d
394 (1954)

MARYLAND

Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth'y v. Meadow-Groft, 243 Md. 515, 221 A.2d 632
(1966)
City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9,
136 A.2d 852 (1957)

MISSISSIPPI

Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75,
178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S.
627 (1938)
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NEW HAMPSHIRE

Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 258, 169
A.2d 634 ( 1961)

NEW JERSEY

Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834
(1964)

TENNESSEE

Mayor and Alderman of the City of Fayetteville v. Wilson, 212 Tenn. 55, 367
S.W.2d 772 (1963)
McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn.
498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958) (found general obligation bonds to be constitutional
when used for public purposes arising
out of a "virtual crisis")
Darnell v. County of Montgomery, 202
Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d 373 (1957)
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APPENDIX C
The following is a list of cases finding unconstitutional legislation authorizing industrial development
revenue bond financing* and which failed to find a public purpose in such legislation:
FLORIDA

State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1952) (dictum that there was
a lending of credit when revenue bonds
issued)

IDAHO

Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg.
Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960)
(Idaho Constitution is more restrictive
than Utah Constitution as to "lending
of credit" : "No [state] subdivision,
shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith
thereof directly or indirectly, in any
manner, to, or in aid of any individual,
association or corporation, for any
amount or for any purpose whatever
... " (Idaho Const. Art. 8 §4)

NEBRASKA

State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb.
223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957) (case overruled by constitutional amendment;
revenue bond program found constitutional in case cited in Appendix A)

NORTH CAROLINA Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority, .... N.C .
... ., 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968)
OHIO

State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St.
44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964)

-x- A Maryland statute allowing a state industrial development
agency to guarantee loans to private companies was found to
violate the lending of credit proviso of the Maryland Constitution.
Development Credit Corp. v. McKean, 237 A.2d 742 (Md. 1968). :

A Georgia case, Smith v. State, 222 Ga. 552, 150 S.E.2d 868 (1966),
held that a tax exemption granted by a state constitutional amendment
violated due process and equal protection of federal fourteenth amend
ment.
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